Shawcross is superbly equipped to assess the impact of rogue States and terrorist organizations on global security. He is also well placed to comment on the risks of preemptive invasion for existing alliances and the future prospects for the international rule of law. An analysis of the ways in which the international community has "confronted evil," Shawcross' brief polemic argues that U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were right to go to war without UN clearance, and that the hypocrisy of Jacques Chirac was largely responsible for the collapse of international consensus over the war. His curious identification with Bush and his neoconservative allies as the most qualified to implement this humanitarian agenda, however, fails to recognize essential differences between the leftist case for war and the hard-line justification for regime change in Iraq.
INTRODUCTION
In early 2002, as the war in Afghanistan came to an end and a new interim government took power in Kabul, 1 Vice President Richard Cheney was discussing with President George W. Bush the next phase in the war on terrorism. 2 Cheney believed that leaving Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in power at the end of the Gulf War was a mistake, and now Bush had a chance to make foreign policy following the war in Afghanistan has been centered around three general principles: (1) to combat terror wherever it exists using all means at its disposal; (2) to define bilateral relationships in terms of countries that support the war on terrorism and those that do not; and (3) to prevent "rogue" Nations from threatening the world with weapons of mass destruction. Id. it right. 3 Whether or not Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, and whether or not Iraq could ever be linked to Al Qaeda's global terrorist network, was of no concern. 4 Eager to atone for the "sins" of his father, 5 Bush resolved to wage war against evil, and Iraq had all at once become "the most important battle of our time. ' "6 According to Bahram Saleh, Prime Minister of the Kurdish-controlled zone of northern Iraq, "Iraq is the nexus where many issues are coming together -Islam versus democracy, the West versus the axis of evil, Arab nationalism versus some different types of political culture." 7 In his rousing appeal to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to it as the "nexus of poisons and terror." 8 Whatever the legacy of the war becomes, Iraq may also be a nexus of filial devotion and personal vengeance.
Much has been written about the growth of Islamic consciousness and its pathological collision with modernity as the basis for the terrorist threat. 9 For those intent on destroying the foundations of the international community and restoring religious autocracy to the Middle East, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq offered an opportunity for fundamentalist commandos and terrorist brigades to provoke the Apocalypse between East and West in the name of Allah."° Hence, the pervasive fear that an attack on Iraq would provoke a Christian-Muslim "clash of civilizations." 1 1 For those in the Bush administration subscribing to a more aggressive foreign policy approach, Iraq provided a chance 9. See SRAwcROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 225 (discussing growth of Muslim consciousness and its role in global conflict). See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72(3) FOREIGN AlT. 22-28 (1993) (characterizing future of global conflict as monumental collision of rival cultures). Samuel Huntington, who coined the phrase "the clash of civilizations," argues that military Islamic resurgence is "in large part a response to modernization and globalization." Id. Historian Bernard Lewis similarly downplays the differences between specific Muslim/Arab grievances in his contention that the "roots of Muslim rage" against the West are to be found in the essence of Islam itself. See Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim rage, ATLANTIC, available at http://www. theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm (Sept. 1990) (detailing origins of Muslim resentment towards West as based on fundamental differences in interaction between politics and religion). But see NOAH FELDMAN, AITERJIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IsLAMiIC DEMOCRACY 31 (2003) (pointing out that opposing worldviews in contact may also interact to produce new, composite "ideas").
10. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 224 (arguing that U.S.-led occupation of Iraq is justified in light of threat posed by radical Islam). This militant vision of radical Islam was expressed as early as 1984 by Ayatollah Khomeini, the theocratic ruler of Iran who supported Islamic terrorist groups targeting Israel and called for Islamic revolution throughout the region: "War is a blessing for the world and for every [N] ation. It is Allah himself who commands men to wage war and kill." Id. Ideologues like Osama bin Laden similarly insist that "all the evils in the Islamic world follow from the abandonment of the divine heritage of Islam," a trend for which they blame the West. Id. at 15. See also MacFarquhar, supra note 7 (referring to Mullah Mustapha Kreikar's proclamation that Iraq war would be culmination of all Muslim efforts since collapse of Caliphate in early twentieth century).
11. See SHAwcRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 173 (detailing international response to overthrow of Hussein). French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, for instance, has insisted that France and the Pope's opposition to the war was the only reason the world managed to avoid a Christian-Muslim "clash of civilizations." Id. See also Dominique de Villepin, Speech before the United Nations Security Council, available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr (July 3, 2003) (warning international community to "beware of playing into.., hands of those who want.., clash of civilizations"). See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998) (arguing that global community should be seen in terms of cultural "civilizations" fated to conflict rather than as collection of independent States).
to counteract the threat of militant Islam through the equally militant promotion of Western-style democracy. 12 As appealing as such absolutist agendas may be, particularly to those frozen in dogmatic extremity, there is a real danger of conflating religious fanaticism and political grievances under the catch-all ideology of Islamic extremism. 1 3 Bush's war against an amorphous and irrational "axis of evil" provides a case in point: by refusing to deal with the political disparities and moral ambiguities inherent in the terrorist threat, the Bush administration has relied on the same rationale to justify war on the two very different dangers of repressive tyranny and religious nihilism. 4 One needs only look at the tensions between Europe and the United States to recognize the polarization engendered by Bush's foreign policy on Iraq. 5 A Reagan-like politician with a strong religious bent, George W. Bush has been decried as the "American idiot" 1 6 who has contributed to "la crgtinisation"" 7 of 12. See Foer & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 18 (recounting Cheney's unsuccessful attempts to convince former Bush administration to support Boris Yeltsin's election as President of Russian Republic). Grounded in the belief that true international security depends on the expansion of "the community of peaceful democratic [N]ations," the aggressive promotion of democracy through military power, currently advocated by the neoconservative movement and many in the Bush administration, initially emerged out of Richard Cheney's push for regime change in the former Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Id 24. See SHAwcROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 59 (discussing idea of qualified sovereignty). Far from dismissive of the radical neoconservative policy recommendations, Shawcross argues that "some of the neocon arguments about human rights sound close to mainstream liberal internationalist thought," and subscribes to the theory of revocable sovereignty embraced by neoconservatives as sufficient justification for unilateral Others find it more instructive to consider the possibility that it is not leftists who have strayed from their principles, but reality itself that has gone astray. James Traub attributes the leftist case for war to the underlying realization that "a morally driven foreign policy looks very different after September 11 than it did before," and that the invasion of Iraq is therefore the "consummation, rather than the contradiction" of traditional leftist beliefs. 28 In a world where militant terrorists advocating mass murder on religious grounds view themselves as "freedom fighters" and radical liberals advocating military action on idealistic grounds call themselves "neoconservatives," the leftist conversion somehow begins to make sense.
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As a good friend of both Kofi Annan and Sergio Vieira de Mello, the high-ranking Brazilian diplomat killed in the UN bombing in Baghdad last August, 30 Shawcross is superbly equipped to assess the impact of rogue States and terrorist organizations on global security. 1 He is also well placed to comment on the risks of preemptive invasion for existing alliances and the ing Shawcross' conversion from role as "poster boy of anti-Vietnamese War Left" to friend of American hard Right as betrayal of principles).
27 future prospects for the international rule of law.
3 2 An analysis of the ways in which the international community has "confronted evil," 33 Shawcross' brief polemic argues that U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were right to go to war without UN clearance, 4 and that the hypocrisy of Jacques Chirac was largely responsible for the collapse of international consensus over the war.
3 5 His curious identification with Bush and his neoconservative allies as the most qualified to implement this humanitarian agenda, however, fails to recognize essential differences between the leftist case for war and the hard-line justification for regime change in Iraq.
I. ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS
Whether or not one subscribes to the view that Bush cooked the intelligence to justify a war that many in his cabinet had advocated for years, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has, if nothing else, provoked an impassioned debate over how international relations should be conducted in the post-September 11 th world. To liberal internationalists, preserving the legal authority and moral credibility of the United Nations as the principle forum for ensuring peace and security remains paramount. 3 than stellar record of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leona, however, has exposed fundamental flaws in a system intended to ensure collective security while, at the same time, respecting national sovereignty. 3 Long before September 11, 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan prompted a massive shift in traditional UN doctrine when he declared that human rights would finally "take precedence over concerns of [S]tate sovereignty." 3 9 Responding to the assertion of national sovereignty as justification for domestic repression and recognizing the international security implications of humanitarian crises, Annan had implicitly authorized the greater use of force in humanitarian intervention. 4°B ut because the United Nations, and Annan especially, remains "multilateralist by precedent," 4 the unilateral approach espoused by the United States continues to challenge the foundations of international law and fracture the transatlantic alliances established under its aegis. 42 An influential group of ad- 40. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 59-60 (quoting from two speeches before General Assembly in summer of 1998 and on September 20, 1999). Annan's argument for qualified sovereignty is grounded on the idea that the UN Charter was "not meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity" and that "a great number of peoples ... need more than just words of sympathy from the international community." Id.
41. See Foer, supra note 38, at 20 (quoting from Annan's speech before General Assembly on September 12, 2002).
42. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has ministrative officials, referred to derisively as the "ideologues of American Empire," 4 " now maintains that global security can be achieved only by rejecting international treaties and institutions, embracing the doctrine of preventative war, and eschewing diplomacy for unilateralist force whenever core interests are at stake. 4 44. See generally FRUM & PERLE, supra note 24 (arguing that militant promotion of democracy overseas and strengthening of security measures at home are only way to "win" war on terror). Among the policy recommendations made by neocon hard-liners include the aggressive push for regime change in Iran, North Korea and Saudi Arabia, Syria, the total abandonment of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a new PATRIOT Act that would revoke the citizenship of Americans found donating money to "terrorist" organizations, and the threatened withdrawal of U.S. membership from the United Nations unless it amends its Charter to allow for "preemptive self-defense." Id.
45. It is impossible to make sense of either the neocon agenda or the leftist case for war without considering the history of the United States' schizophrenic foreign policy in the Middle East. The "bastard offspring" of nationalism and socialism, the dictatorial style of government and indoctrination practiced by Saddam Hussein's regime has never been in doubt.
4 7 Closely following Joseph Stalin's model of expurgating conspirators, Hussein's first act as president involved reading out the names of fifty-four suspected co-conspirators at a meeting of senior party members and ordering those officials not suspected of treachery to take part in the firing squads that dispatched the "guilty." 4 8 In 1988, Hussein ordered at least 5,000 people from the Kurdish town of Halabja gassed to death for collaborating with Iran. 4 9 Three years later, he deployed some eighty Republican Guard tanks to brutally suppress the Shia rebellion in Basra."° It has since been estimated that Hussein has murdered at least 300,000 of his own people since 1991.51 For much of his regime, however, the [Vol. 27:2062
United States has turned a blind eye to these human rights violations, even providing him with limited intelligence assistance, in the hopes that he might help curb the even greater danger perceived from Iran. 5 2 Not until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 did the United States begin to reappraise the threat. 5 3 Yet UN Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized the Gulf War, failed to mandate Hussein's removal. 5 4 Prior to Bush's radical foreign policy changes, the intent has always been, as the Clinton administration often said, to leave Hussein "in his box" 5 5 in the hopes that he might be overthrown from within. propaganda to foster anti-Americanism within international community). Hussein's propaganda machine was adept at exploiting the oil-for-food program by disallowing the distribution of supplies to the Iraqis while convincing many in the international community that UN sanctions were starving a generation of Iraqi children. Id. 65. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing adverse consequences of containment for welfare of Iraqi people as well as authority of United Nations). Referring to the U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia since 1991, bin Laden cited the 'armed Christian soldiers" in the sacred land as the ultimate sacrilege. Id.
should deal with criminal States is as dangerous to international peace and security as the terrorist threat itself. 66 Containment proved to be an unsatisfactory compromise between Security Council Members advocating a more aggressive approach toward Iraq and those -notably China, France, and Russiaurging the relaxation of sanctions and inspections in the interests of commercial trade.
6 7 France bears the brunt of the book's denunciation; Shawcross blames French President Jacques Chirac for deliberately undermining both the war itself and the subsequent reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 6 70. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, SUpra note 5, at 181-82 (recounting how reaction of many Western intellectuals to Iraq war has been informed by "reflexive anti-Americanism"). It is important to note that anti-Americanism is not limited to Europe; many Americans now perceive their own country as a greater threat to world peace than Iraq. Prominent novelist and essayist Gore Vidal, for instance, has dismissed the "Bush-Cheney junta," claiming that "there are many bad regimes on earth .. .at the moment I would put the Bush regime as one of them." Id. For an interesting take on how countries tend to embrace American culture while decrying its global influence, Shawcross' puzzled bewilderment turns to utter contempt when he addresses the issue of French anti-Americanism and its impact on European foreign policy. 77 Arising out of a centuriesold tradition of condescension and fear, French antipathy for the United States has become a national pastime offering a "rare bring United States into direct conflict with major regional powers as each Nation struggles to shape future course of history).
72. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 78 (discussing political and cultural origins of global resentment towards United States).
73. See Tariq Ali, Re-Colonizing Iraq, NEw LEFT REV., available at http://www.newleft review.net/NLR25501.shtml (May-June 2003) (arguing that Bush administration has used September 11 th as excuse for pursuing aggressive imperialist agenda).
74. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 183 (describing critical reaction of many Western intellectuals and artists to war in Iraq).
75. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 184 (recounting how anti-Americanism has often been tainted by conspiracy theory). Questioning the United States' convenient failure to avert September 11 th, Michael Meacher argues that the war on terrorism "has the hallmarks of a political myth propagated to pave the way for a wholly different agenda -the U.S. goal of world hegemony. terrain ... where conflicting political and intellectual forces can find common ground. '78 As Shawcross is quick to point out, however, it is also a pathological delusion and a disingenuous consolation for the European failure to cope with international conflict. 79 According to Shawcross, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty,°i n purporting to "mark a new stage in the process of European integration," merely created "a new bureaucracy and new pretensions." 8 " Far from being the self-proclaimed "moral conscience of the world," France's failure to take action against the genocidal extremists in Rwanda Drawing heavily from the work of foreign policy analyst Robert Kagan, Shawcross further argues that Europe's growing collectivist outlook, premised on an unwavering belief in the sovereign equality of all Nations, is at heart, a feeble attempt to rationalize individual States' inferiority complex in the face of American supremacy. 8 4 Empires have always been targeted by the disgruntled, the disenfranchised, and the dispossessed, who struggle to find ways to assert distinct social and political identities." 5 Shawcross maintains that since no single European power can approach the United States in terms of economic or military strength, attempts to "pool sovereignty" like the Franco-German alliance and the European Union are actually meant to create an alternative, or "counterweight," to the world's only superpower." 6 Still, for all the growing enthusiasm over the emergence of a "United States of Europe" as an integrated and formidable political entity, Shawcross points out that it was the United States, and not NATO, 7 that put a stop to the Balkan massacres after 200,000 people had perished under Europe's care; 8 8 and it was the United States, and not the European Union, that liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban regime. 9
84. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 89 (claiming that Europe's growing emphasis on international law is response to failure to match power of United States). According to Robert Kagan, Europe is "moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation," while the United States continues to "exercise power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security ... 
II. THE UNILATERAL SOLUTION
Shawcross undoubtedly agrees with Tony Blair's declaration, in a July 2003 speech before Congress, that the notion of Europe competing with the United States is both "dangerous" and an "anachronism. ' " 90 Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile Shawcross' staunch support of the United Nations, that pre-eminent of all international organizations, with his faith in American supremacy as essential to the security of the world. 9 1 Shawcross' allegiances seem genuinely torn between a deep-rooted faith in multilateralism, shared by most liberal internationalists, and a growing support of preemptive unilateralism based on the Manichaean evildoers-respond-only-to-force worldview. In Deliver Us from Evil, he dismissed the "idealized belief' that the United Nations is an independent and objective body of sovereign States designed to bring peace and economic development to the world. 9 2 He seems equally reticent, however, to fully adopt the neoconservative position that multilateralism is merely a "synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator. " "
The familiar critique that the United Nations has never been more than a political instrument of the United States 9 4 is lion, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 23, 1995 (arguing that number of fatalities in Bosnian war was actually between 25,000 and 60,000).
90. SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 222 (arguing that despite opposition of France and Germany, most European governments supported the war). Blair fervently expressed his support of the U.S.-British alliance as follows: "If Europe and America are together, the rest will work with us. If we split . . .nothing but mischief will be the result." See Tony Blair's Speech to the U.S. Congress, GUARDIAN, available at http://www. guardian.co.uk (July 18, 2003) true to the extent that the UN Security Council can only act when it suits the interests of its five permanent Members, one of which is the United States. 9 " But as France's public and unequivocal opposition to the war in Iraq demonstrates, the United States has also been forced to grapple with the ideological and political divisions among its veto-wielding neighbors as well as the obstinate neutrality of the UN Secretary-General himself. 9 6 For in spite of Powell's pet phrase, "My man Kofi," Annan has never acted as if he were just another member of the Bush Cabinet in his firm adherence to a constructionist interpretation of Security Council resolutions. 7 That the Bush administration tried so hard to fit its case against Hussein into the UN framework governing the use of force runs counter to the proposition that the United Nations is simply a front for American unilateralism. 98 A brief overview of the legal justifications for military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter might be instructive here. 9 9 Although Article 2(4) prohibits any Nation from us-95. See The United Nations: A Force for Peace?, 9 SOCIALIST REV. AOTEAROA N.Z., available at http://www.iso.org.nz/sr/9/un.htm (Summer 2001-02) (arguing that UN provides humanitarian cover for imperialist aspirations of United States). According to John Bolton, a former Bush Senior Undersecretary of State, "[there is no United Nations... [t] here is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the United States, when it suits our interests, and when we can get others to go along." Id.
96. See Foer, supra note 38, at 20 (discussing love-hate relationship between UN Secretary-General and Bush administration).
97. See id. Although Annan is generally regarded as one the greatest secretarygenerals in United Nations history for his efforts to reform the UN's vast bureaucracy and his innovative approach to the doctrine of State sovereignty, he has been much criticized for his failure to take a more aggressive stance towards rogue Nations that continually flout UN authority: "[u]nfortunately, Annan reverts to conventional UN secretary-general behavior at the worst possible moments. In the face of genocide and dictators, he loses his nerve." Id.
98. See Rachel S. Taylor, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, WORLD PRESS REv., available at http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (assessing merits of legal arguments proffered by Bush administration in case against Iraq). In addition to the infamous argument concerning the risk Hussein's weapons of mass destruction posed to the United States, Powell also contended that Iraq had to answer for its numerous violations of Security Council resolutions, so as to prevent placing the United Nations "in danger of irrelevance." Id. Blair relied more heavily on Powell's second argument, while Bush tended to emphasize the link between Hussein's corrupt regime and the global terrorist network. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 186-87 (describing backlash against Tony Blair following failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq).
99. See U.N. CHARTER, chap. VII. Entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the [Vol. 27:2062 ing force against another,°° the Charter permits two exceptions to this institutional respect for territorial integrity: when force is necessary to maintain "international peace and security," ' ' and when force is required in self-defense against an "armed attack."' 1 2 The latter represents the sole provision enabling the use of unilateral force,'"S though its mandate has gradually been extended to include situations where an armed attack is "imminent." 1°4 In a 1962 legal opinion on the options facing Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy Justice Department noted that the UN Charter does not "prohibit the taking of unilateral preventive action in self-defense prior to the occurrence of an armed attack." 10 5 Shawcross cites the eminent British barrister Christopher Greenwood when he asserts that the increasing severity of the modern terrorist threat demands a corresponding expansion of the traditional scope of "imminent danger," as first defined by Daniel Webster in the Caroline case.
0 6
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," Chapter VII of the Charter vests in the Security Council the authority to address threats to international peace and security through legally binding coercive measures. it is permissible to launch armed attacks, how warfare must be waged, and how relevant legal norms should be enforced).
106. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 115-16 (arguing that policy of "anticipatory self-defense" is justified by gravity of modern terrorist threat). Originating from an 1837 incident in which British troops attacked the ship Caroline, used by U.S. citizens to take supplies to Canadian rebels fighting British rule, the definition of "imminent" in the context of self-defense traditionally referred to any need for action that is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-Still, it is difficult to see how the doctrine of preemptive selfdefense, as advocated by the Bush administration in his National Security Strategy (the "Bush doctrine") 1 07 fits within even an expanded version of the UN framework. Unilateralism is anathema to the underlying principles of the Charter, and Article 51 grants the right of self-defense only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."' 8 This suggests that the use of force would not be justified so long as there is time for deliberation before the Security Council. 1 0 9 With Iraq, the Security Council has had more than twelve years to come up with ways to contend with Saddam Hussein. 1° As Shawcross himself concedes, there has been no evidence that Iraq poses an "immediate" threat to global security, although there is "irrefutable evidence" that his intent to develop WMD technology constitutes an "inevitable" threat. to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required." 1 7 Although Resolution 1441 was passed by a vote of 15-0 on November 8, 2002,18 the deliberate ambiguity of its phrasing was meant to appease the reservations of more reticent Council Members like France, which insisted that any response to Iraqi noncompliance be worked out in a second resolution." 9 Shawcross' account of the frantic five-week search for the nine Member votes needed to pass this second resolution exemplifies the continued vitality of the United Nations as a truly democratic institution, as well as the centrality of the Security Council as the world's most important forum for public de- bate.
12 ' As Syria insisted on the need to protect the "dignity" of Iraq and the French and Americans quarreled over the shifting connotations of a "material breach,"' ' 2 1 the United States evinced a genuine attempt to exploit the multilateral channels of international law. 122 That it eventually failed to secure the necessary votes is largely due to French PresidentJacque Chirac's attempt to derail Anglo-British diplomatic efforts before the Council. 23 Echoing the view that "Chirac would now have the blood of American and British soldiers on his hands," Shawcross argues that France's decision to veto the second Security Council resolution actually precipitated the war by ensuring that there would never be enough pressure on Hussein to disarm voluntarily. 24 Only briefly touching on Bush's mistreatment of Blair, Shawcross openly condemns Chirac for single-handedly undermining the international rule of law and endangering global security. 125 This is a fresh perspective, one untainted by the reflexive anti-Americanism that seems to have informed so many Western intellectuals' reaction to the war. 126 For much of the international media and the vast majority of anti-war protesters, Bush has been universally vilified as the second biggest villain of the affair. 12 7 Even liberals willing to consider the removal of Hussein as the next logical step in the "war against terror" do not hesitate to condemn Bush for having bungled the diplomacy necessary to assemble a cohesive coalition. 128 The United States and Britain's decision to go to war without clear-cut UN authority brought with it the usual accusations of political hypocrisy and reckless impudence, although many failed to realize that this was not the first time in recent years that distinct segments of the international community decided to take matters into their own hands. 12 ' Following unsuccessful efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement between the Yugoslav government and the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army in early 1999, NATO organized an aerial bombardment of Serb targets despite the failure to secure a Security Council resolution in advance. 13° NATO's impulsiveness was given post hoc legitimacy, however, as the Council subsequently defeated, by a vote of 12-3, a proposed resolution by Russia and China to demand an immediate end to the air strikes. 4 The Coalition's inability to find incriminating evidence of Hussein's armory following the war was initially ascribed to the proverbial haystack problem -part of Hussein's organized strategy of deception. 135 It was common practice for the regime to hide chemical shells among the sprawling collection of conventional weapons he had amassed since his rise to power in 1979.136 It soon became clear, however, that there was no such evidence to be found, 1 37 at which point critics of the war instantly protested and proponents of the war had to come up with an alternative defense.
13 8 Once the WMD theory had turned out to be problematic, apologists for the war adopted the counter-intuitive position that the dearth of evidence uncovered since the fall of the regime actually constituted definitive proof of Hussein's guilt. 3 9 Shawcross himself falls into this trap when he mentions that although the Interim Report by U.S. weapons inspector David Kay discovered nothing concrete, it had shed light on the elaborate efforts to which Hussein had gone to destroy evidence and disrupt the inspection process. 0
Another typical response to allegations of fraud has been to highlight Hussein's criminal intent to acquire WMDs in the future. a41 According to Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish diplomat who had been appointed the first head of UNSCOM, although "the Iraqi nuclear weapons projects lacked access to fissile material," it was "advanced with regard to weapon design. ' It is one thing for the international community to judge States based on their intentions and capabilities, 4 4 but quite another to condemn them with circumstantial evidence grounded on speculation of what they might be capable of in the future. Shawcross greatly understates the extent of the intelligence problem when he argues that, although intelligence can be wrong, "it has to be taken seriously when there is nothing else.' ity Report 14 6 universe of totalitarian morality and preemptive aggression advocated by certain neocon hard-liners. In a recent panel discussion on the historical ramifications of the zeitgeist that has empowered him, Richard Perle was unrepentant about the CIA's intelligence failure leading up to the war: "The fact that we have failed to unearth stockpiles [of WMDs]," said Perle, "doesn't change the assessment that had to be made at the time. ' Rooted in the belief that admitting fault only projects weakness and invites more abuse, 148 the Bush administration's reluctance to admit its intelligence failures in Iraq is indicative of the neocon tendency to proceed as if all the events of the past three years -the missing WMDs, the mounting post-war resistance, the massive costs -have somehow vindicated their original beliefs.
14 1
In his defense against some of the more malicious attacks and "absurd caricatures" of neocon views, 1 50 Shawcross either fails to recognize, or does not discuss, the essential differences between liberal internationalist thought and neoconservative doctrine. Perhaps the distinction is not readily apparent: both pro-war apologists and anti-war protesters lay claim to pragmatic agendas in the sense that both advocate foreign policies tailored to respond to what they perceive as the true terrorist threat after September 11 th. Irving Kristol, the "godfather" of neoconservatism, memorably defined a neocon as "a liberal who was mugged by reality, 151 prompting M.I.T. economics professor Lester Thurow to define a neo-liberal as "a liberal who was mugged by reality, but who has declined to press charges.
1 52 It is a clever aphorism that underscores the political schisms currently afflicting U.S. foreign policy.
While both neocons and liberals seek to improve the most troubled places in the world, hard-liners want to do so by aggressively installing democratic regimes that will be primarily friendly to the United States and its allies; liberals want to facilitate the formation of democratic governments that will be primarily friendly to their own people. 153 Neocons dismiss the founding principles of the United Nations and advocate unrestrained unilateral action whenever core interests are at stake; 154 liberals advocate the pursuit of UN authority and rely on the multilateral mechanisms established by international law whenever possible. 155 Most importantly, neocons treat the invasion of Iraq as "a divinely inspired crusade against evil which only a heretic could oppose;" 156 liberals view the war in Iraq as a distraction from the real war on terror. 57 This is the critical difference between pro-war polemics like William Shawcross' Allies and selfstyled "manuals for victory" like Frum and Perle's An End to Evil.' 5 8 Ultimately, it is also where the battle lines will, no doubt, be drawn as the United States struggles to reconstruct the devastation of Hussein's deposed regime.
2003), at http://www.lewrockwell.com (discussing distinction between "paleoconservatives" and "neoconservatives").
152. 158. See FRUM & PERLE, supra note 24, at 9 (discussing need for decisive action in war on terror).
Resolution 14831" "opens the way to peace which we must all build together," the decision to give the United States and Britain absolute control until Iraq establishes its own government is akin to endorsing Anglo-American hegemony in the country. Forcing democracy on societies traditionally schooled in repression necessarily requires a precarious balancing between establishing popular sovereignty within prescribed deadlines and meeting the onerous requirements of the constitutional process. According to Middle East expert Fouad Ajami, "[a] political culture that averts its gaze from mass graves and works itself into self-righteous hysteria over a foreign presence in an Arab country is a culture that has turned its back on political reason."167 Shawcross fails to address it in his book, but one wonders whether a more competent leader than George W. Bush, perhaps one with a greater degree of "political reason," might have taken the time to better plan the peace as well as the war.
